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INTRODUCTION 
A great deal of criticism has been directed at the United States 
patent system due to spiraling patent litigation costs and the 
inconsistent quality of patents issued by the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office (the “Patent Office”).1  The judicially 
A PDF version of this Comment is available online at 
http://law.fordham.edu/publications/article.ihtml?pubID=200&id=2942.  Visit http:// 
www.iplj.net for access to the complete Journal archive. 
*  J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2009; B.S., Rutgers University, 
2004.  I want to thank my family and friends for their love and support, especially my 
mom and dad whose enduring commitment to me made this all possible.  Also many 
thanks are due to the Fordham IPLJ editorial board and staff as well as my mentor Ariella 
who is great with words. 
 1 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF 
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, executive summary 4–5 & ch. 5 at 24–25 
(2003) [hereinafter FTC report], available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/10/ 
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created doctrine of inequitable conduct is one of the most highly 
criticized areas of this patent system and an area recently targeted 
for reform because its inherently subjective nature engenders 
significant litigation costs and deters patent applicants from being 
forthright and honest, thereby impacting patent quality.2  While 
scholars and practitioners alike have engaged in numerous 
discussions about whether reforming the doctrine of inequitable 
conduct would lower litigation costs and improve patent quality, 
few have undertaken a statistical analysis to quantify the effect of 
any such reform. 
This Comment will discuss the evolution of the inequitable 
conduct standard and will examine, using statistical analysis, the 
policy considerations and consequences of reforming this standard 
through legislation.  Part I sets forth an explanation of how the 
inequitable conduct standard developed and analyzes how courts 
have been implementing this standard since its inception.  Part II 
investigates the allure of pleading even a meritless inequitable 
conduct defense in an effort to avoid a finding of patent 
infringement and presents a statistical analysis of how courts 
adjudicate the defense.  Part III reviews the current reform 
proposals and the policy implications of these proposals.  Part IV 
examines the pending legislation designed to reform this standard 
and discusses the effect such legislation would have on patent 
litigation.  Finally, the author endorses in the conclusion of the 
Comment his view that reform lies not in modifying the 
inequitable conduct standard but in modifying the procedural 
paradigm in which such claims are brought. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Inequitable conduct is a defense a party accused of patent 
infringement can raise during a patent litigation.3  The defense is 
invoked in litigation when there is evidence that a patent applicant 
cpreport.htm; NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 47, 70 
(Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter NAS study], available at 
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/10976.html. 
 2 NAS study, supra note 1, at 7, 121–23. 
 3 See 6 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 19.03 (MB 2008). 
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breached a duty of candor and good faith to the Patent Office by 
engaging in behavior such as misrepresenting information or 
omitting information that might adversely impact the Patent 
Office’s decision to grant a patent.4  If a court determines 
inequitable conduct occurred, the court can hold the patent 
unenforceable, meaning that the patent holder cannot enforce the 
patent rights on other parties even if the patent is valid and being 
infringed by these other parties.5 
Whether inequitable conduct occurred is determined using 
proof of materiality and intent shown by clear and convincing 
evidence.6  Materiality, in turn, is established by using one of a 
number of judicially sanctioned tests,7 each of which evaluates 
whether affirmative misrepresentations or omissions of 
information should be considered material.8  In deciding whether 
information is “material,” the courts typically utilize the 
“reasonable examiner” test because it is the broadest test and the 
one that most closely aligns with how business should be 
conducted with the Patent Office.9  This “reasonable examiner” 
test examines whether “there is a substantial likelihood that a 
reasonable examiner would consider it important in deciding 
whether to allow the application to issue as a patent.”10  In finding 
materiality pursuant to this test, the court determines whether a 
threshold level of materiality has been reached.11  Though, 
information that is merely cumulative to what was already taken 
into account by the examiner is generally disregarded because it 
does not raise a new issue beyond what the examiner previously 
considered.12 
 4 Id. 
 5 See Lummus Indus., Inc. v. D.M. & E. Corp., 862 F.2d 267, 274 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 6 Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 872 (Fed. Cir. 
1988). 
 7 Digital Control, Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 
2006). 
 8 See Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. McGaw, Inc., 149 F.3d 1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 9 Digital Control, 437 F.3d at 1315–16. 
 10 Id. at 1315 (citing PTO Rules of Practice in Patent Cases, 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1977)). 
 11 Baxter Int’l, 149 F.3d at 1327. 
 12 See Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1582 
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (citing Halliburton Co. v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 925 F.2d 1435, 
1440 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). 
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In addition to determining materiality, it is also the 
responsibility of the court to determine whether the evidence 
indicates that the patent applicant possessed a threshold level of 
intent to deceive or mislead the Patent Office.13  To make such a 
finding of intent—a subjective determination of the state of mind 
of the individual allegedly involved in the misconduct14—a court 
must find that the conduct, when viewed in light of all the 
evidence, including evidence of good faith, indicates sufficient 
culpability to warrant a finding that the patent applicant intended to 
deceive or mislead the Patent Office.15  Intent to deceive does not, 
however, need to be proven by direct evidence.16  Clear and 
convincing inferential evidence of the circumstances surrounding 
the alleged conduct is sufficient to prove intent to deceive.17  In the 
event the court finds that the threshold levels of materiality and 
intent have been established, the court must then balance such 
evidence.18  If the information is highly material, this balancing 
can result in a finding of inequitable conduct even when there is 
not much evidence of intent.19  Similarly, an inequitable conduct 
finding may occur when information is not very material, if there 
exists strong evidence of intent.20 
A. Court Involvement in the Standard of Inequitable Conduct 
The doctrine of inequitable conduct arose from a series of 
Supreme Court cases ending in 1945.21  The series culminated with 
 13 Baxter Int’l, 149 F.3d at 1327. 
 14 NAS study, supra note 1, at 122. 
 15 Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 (Fed. Cir. 
1988). 
 16 Baxter Int’l, 149 F.3d at 1329; see also Hycor Corp. v. Schueter Co., 740 F.2d 1529, 
1540 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
 17 Baxter Int’l, 149 F.3d at 1329. 
 18 Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 
2003). 
 19 NAS study, supra note 1. 
 20 Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 
1984). 
 21 Digital Control, 437 F.3d at 1315; see Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v Auto. Maint. 
Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945); Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 
238 (1944); see also Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 244 
(1933) (providing the doctrine of unclean hands for equity matters that the Supreme 
Court relies on in Precision, 324 U.S. at 819). 
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Precision Instrument Manufacturing Co. v. Automotive 
Maintenance Machinery Co.,22 where the Supreme Court refused 
to enforce patents tainted with fraud.23  Fashioning an inequitable 
conduct defense from the equitable doctrine of unclean hands, the 
Precision Court stated that applicants “have an uncompromising 
duty to report to [the Patent Office] all facts concerning possible 
fraud or inequitableness underlying the applications in issue.”24  
However, the Precision Court did not articulate any specific test or 
provide any guidance for future courts to help them determine 
when inequitable conduct would be deemed to have occurred (and, 
therefore, when a patent would be rendered unenforceable).25  
Following the Precision Court’s decision, the Patent Office created 
Rule 56, which imposes a duty of candor and good faith on every 
individual who is associated with the filing and prosecution of a 
patent application.26 
Not surprisingly, the inequitable conduct doctrine continued to 
develop through numerous court decisions following the Supreme 
Court’s Precision pronouncement and the Patent Office’s 
implementation of Rule 56.27  As the doctrine evolved, different 
courts fashioned different tests to determine what constituted 
materiality, with some courts using an objective “but for” test, 
other courts using a subjective “but for” test, and yet other courts 
using a “but it may have” test.28  Under the objective “but for” test, 
information is material if it would preclude a patent from being 
issued.29  Courts apply this test by determining whether the 
information involved in the alleged misconduct would invalidate 
the patent if such information was considered.30  The objective 
 22 Precision, 324 U.S. 806. 
 23 Id. at 819. 
 24 Id. at 818. 
 25 Id. at 819. 
 26 Digital Control, 437 F.3d at 1315. 
 27 Cf. id. 
 28 Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 
1984); see also Plastic Container Corp. v. Cont’l Plastics of Okla., Inc., 607 F.2d 885, 
899 (10th Cir. 1984); Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 795–96 (C.C.P.A. 1970); In re 
Multidistrict Litig. Involving Frost Patent, 398 F. Supp. 1353, 1368 (D. Del. 1980). 
 29 Digital Control, 437 F.3d at 1315; Gemveto Jewelry Co. v. Lambert Bros., Inc., 542 
F. Supp. 933, 939–40 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
 30 In re Frost Patent, 398 F. Supp. at 1368. 
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“but for” test is exemplified by Walker Process Equipment v. Food 
Machinery & Chemical Corp.,31 where the Supreme Court held a 
patent invalid because the applicant withheld prior public use 
information from the Patent Office.32  The Court reasoned that 
because prior public use is an absolute bar to patentability, the 
patent would not have been issued “but for” this withholding of 
information.33 
The subjective “but for” test focuses on whether the 
misrepresentation of information actually caused the examiner to 
approve a patent application that would not have otherwise been 
approved.34  In order to find inequitable conduct under the 
subjective “but for” test, a court needs to consider the state of mind 
of the actual examiner who issued the patent.35  In this regard, as 
the Sixth Circuit noted in American Cyanamid Co. v. Federal 
Trade Commission,36 the ultimate questions are: (1) did the 
examiner receive all the information he requested; and (2) did the 
examiner rely on misleading information to issue the patent.37  
This subjective “but for” test is contrasted with the objective “but 
for” test, where the state of mind of the actual examiner is 
irrelevant and a court determination of invalidity is used to 
determine if information is material.38 
The third, the “but it may have” test, seeks to determine if the 
misrepresentation or omission might have reasonably affected the 
examiner’s decision on patentability during prosecution.39  An 
example of this test can be seen in SCM Corp. v. Radio Corp. of 
America,40 where a patent applicant conducted testing to 
distinguish the invention from the prior art,41 and then filed an 
 31 Walker Process Equip. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965). 
 32 Id. at 174. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Digital Control, 437 F.3d at 1315; Gemveto Jewelry, 542 F. Supp. at 939–40. 
 35 James Cronin, Comment, Inequitable Conduct and the Standard of Materiality, 50 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1327, 1340 (2006). 
 36 American Cyanamid Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966). 
 37 Id. at 778. 
 38 Digital Control, 437 F.3d at 1315. 
 39 American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 
1984); see also Digital Control, 437 F.3d at 1315. 
 40 SCM Corp. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 318 F. Supp. 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
 41 Id. at 444. 
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affidavit showing only the test results that supported the 
application, omitting contradictory test results.42  In determining 
materiality, the SCM court focused on whether the withheld 
information was relevant, and reasoned that any inequitable 
conduct in the obtaining of a patent was enough to dissuade a court 
from enforcing the patent against infringers.43  Thus, rather than 
look at the state of mind of the actual examiner, the court 
determines if the misrepresentation or omission might affect any 
examiner’s decision on patentability of the patent application.44 
In 1977, the Patent Office amended Rule 56 to clarify the duty 
of candor and good faith.45  The amended rule was expected to 
stabilize court decisions and aid people applicants in complying 
with the duty of candor and good faith.46  This amended rule 
required applicants to disclose “material” information in their 
possession and went on to provide a definition of what information 
would be deemed material47—a definition fashioned off of the 
Supreme Court’s definition of materiality from a securities fraud 
case.48  Following the Patent Office’s amendment, the courts 
embraced as an appropriate starting point Rule 56’s definition of 
materiality, with the Federal Circuit noting “that the pertinent 
inquiry is not whether a reasonable examiner would want to be 
aware of a particular thing, but whether, after he was aware of it, 
he would ‘consider it important’ in deciding whether to reject one 
or more claims.”49  While subsequent cases before the Federal 
Circuit continued to discuss all four of the materiality tests, the 
Rule 56 “reasonable examiner” test gradually became the sole test 
invoked by the court.50 
 42 Id. at 446. 
 43 Id. at 449. 
 44 Id. at 445. 
 45 Digital Control, Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 46 See Patent Examining and Appeal Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. 5588, 5588 (Jan. 28, 
1977). 
 47 Id. at 5589–90. 
 48 See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). 
 49 Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1362 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 
1984). 
 50 Digital Control, 437 F.3d at 1316. 
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In 1992, the Patent Office again amended Rule 56,51 creating 
“an arguably narrower standard of materiality.”52  This 1992 
amendment—still in place today—provides: 
[I]nformation is material to patentability when it is 
not cumulative to information already of record or 
being made of record in the application, and 
(1) It establishes, by itself or in combination with 
other information, a prima facie case of 
unpatentability of a claim; or 
(2) It refutes, or is inconsistent with, a position the 
applicant takes in (i) Opposing an argument of 
unpatentability relied on by the Office, or (ii) 
Asserting an argument of patentability. 
A prima facie case of unpatentability is established 
when the information compels a conclusion that a 
claim is unpatentable under the preponderance of 
evidence, burden-of-proof standard, giving each 
term in the claim its broadest reasonable 
construction consistent with the specification, and 
before any consideration is given to evidence which 
may be submitted in an attempt to establish a 
contrary conclusion of patentability.53 
Despite this 1992 amendment, it was not until 2006 that a court 
considered how the amended definition would impact a judicial 
determination of materiality, as the amendment by its terms 
applied only to applications pending or filed after March 16, 
1992.54  Although a few post-1992 cases utilized the new Rule 56 
definition,55 the 2006 Federal Circuit case of Digital Control, Inc. 
 51 Duty of Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. 2021, 2021 (Jan. 17, 1992). 
 52 Digital Control, 437 F.3d at 1314. 
 53 PTO Rules of Practice in Patent Cases, 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b) (2008). 
 54 Duty of Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. 2021, 2021 (Jan. 17, 1992); see also Digital 
Control, 437 F.3d at 1316 (deciding that the court did not have to follow the 1992 rule 
change); Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1363–64 (Fed. 
Cir. 2003). 
 55 See Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 204 F.3d 1368, 1374 
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (applying the new rule to a patent issuing on an application filed after 
1992 without any discussion of whether the old standard should apply); Molins PLC v. 
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v. Charles Machine Works56 was the first case to pronounce how 
the 1992 amendment would affect judicial decisions adjudging 
materiality.57  In Digital Control, a three judge panel, which 
included the Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit, decided to 
continue using the 1977 “reasonable examiner” test, even though 
the materiality definition that supported the test no longer existed 
and had been superseded by the 1992 definition.58  In supporting 
its decision, the court reasoned that the “reasonable examiner” 
definition in Rule 56 became the dominant materiality test 
invoked; it did not supplant or replace the case law precedent but 
rather provided another test of materiality.59  Such rationale was 
surprising considering earlier judicial pronouncements indicating 
the court’s willingness to adhere to the definitions set forth by the 
Patent Office.60 
Other than as set forth above, neither the Digital Control 
decision nor subsequent Federal Circuit decisions explained why it 
chose to ignore the materiality definition set forth in the 1992 
amendment and continue using the 1977 Rule 56 standard instead, 
a break from the Federal Circuit’s long tradition of deferring to the 
rules and regulations promulgated by the Patent Office.  Such a 
break from tradition is particularly surprising considering the fact 
that the Patent Office amended Rule 56 “to present a clearer and 
more objective definition of what information the Office considers 
material to patentability,”61 suggesting that the Patent Office 
wanted to alter how the courts determined materiality.  Perhaps the 
decision to ignore the 1992 amendment was a reaction to the 2005 
patent reform bill pending in the House of Representatives, which 
would have severely restricted the materiality standard.62  After all, 
several months prior to the Digital Control decision, Judge Pauline 
Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1179 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (observing that administrative 
rules are not retroactive, but that the case arose before the rule change, so the issue need 
not be addressed). 
 56 Digital Control, 437 F.3d 1309. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. at 1316. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. McGaw, Inc., 149 F.3d 1321, 1328 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 61 Duty of Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. 2021, 2024 (Jan. 17, 1992). 
 62 See H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005). 
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Newman of the Federal Circuit called for Congress and industry to 
broadly examine the impact of the proposed reforms and 
understand the issues involved before moving forward with the 
legislation.63 
Alongside the debate over how materiality should be defined, 
beginning in 2003 the Federal Circuit began relaxing the intent 
standard.64  In 1988, the Federal Circuit held in an en banc 
decision in Kingsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, 
Inc.65 that more than “gross negligence” must exist to justify a 
finding of intent to deceive.66  Kingsdown marked a shift in the 
requirements for making a finding of inequitable conduct, where 
prior to the Kingsdown decision the Court was becoming 
increasingly concerned with how frequently inequitable conduct 
was being raised.67  By rejecting the notion that intent could be 
inferred from an unknowing negligent act, the Kingsdown decision 
implied a certain level of knowledge was needed to prove intent to 
deceive, which was developed by subsequent decisions.68  
Historically the courts have allowed intent to be inferred from the 
facts and circumstances of the case due to the difficulty of proving 
an individual knowingly deceived the Patent Office.69  To infer 
intent requires that the applicant knew of the information, the 
applicant knew or should have known of the materiality of the 
information, and the applicant has not provided a credible 
explanation for withholding or misrepresenting the information.70  
A “should-have-known” standard was developed to address 
 63 Marius Meland, Federal Judges Urge Caution on Patent Reform, IP LAW 360, June 
13, 2005, available at http://www.law360.com/registrations/user_registration? 
article_id=3559. 
 64 James E. Hanft & Stacey S. Kerns, The Return of the Inequitable Conduct Plague, 
19 INTELL. PROP. & TECH.  L.J. 1, 2 (2007). See generally Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. 
Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 65 Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 66 Id. at 876. 
 67 Cf. id.; supra text accompanying note 23 (discussing Precision Instrument 
Manufacturing Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co., in which the Supreme 
Court refused to enforce patents tainted with fraud). 
 68 See Hanft & Kerns, supra note 64, at 1. 
 69 Bruno Indep. Living Aids, Inc. v. Acorn Mobility Servs., Ltd., 394 F.3d 1348, 1354 
(Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 70 Nordberg, Inc. v. Telsmith, Inc., 82 F.3d 394, 397 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
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situations when there is a disregard for warnings that material 
information existed or there is cultivation of ignorance to avoid 
actual knowledge.71  If there is no actual knowledge and no 
warnings about the existence of material information, no intent to 
deceive can be found.72  However, the Federal Circuit panel 
decisions have altered the knowledge requirement in the “should-
have-known” standard and replaced the need for evidence with a 
positive inferen 73
In the 2005 case Novo Nordisk Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Bio-
Technology General Corp.,74 the Federal Circuit found inequitable 
conduct occurred when the inventor had no actual knowledge of 
the materiality of the information and had no warnings about the 
materiality of the information.75  There, a Dutch inventor 
inadvertently wrote the final step of a process partially in the past 
tense, insinuating that he completed the step when, in fact, he had 
not.76  Although there existed no evidence that the Dutch inventor 
or the prosecuting attorneys ever knew or suspected that there was 
a mistake in how the patent application was drafted,77 the Court 
inferred intent, reasoning that the inventor was aware the final step 
had not been completed and charging the inventor with 
“knowledge of the law,” even though the Manual of Patent 
Examination Procedures (“MPEP”) is not law.78  The court 
therefore used knowledge of law to impute that the inventor should 
have known of the materiality of the misrepresentation to find 
intent, in contrast to earlier precedent, which held no intent could 
be found where no knowledge or warnings about the materiality 
existed.79 
 71 FMC Corp. v. Hennessy Indus. Inc., 836 F.2d 521, 526 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
 72 Nordberg, 82 F.3d at 397. 
 73 Ferring v. Barr, 437 F.3d 1181, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 74 Novo Nordisk Pharm., Inc. v. Bio-Tech. Gen. Corp., 424 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 
2005). 
 75 Id. at 1361. 
 76 Id. at 1360–61. 
 77 Id. at 1361. 
 78 Id.  The MPEP rules suggest that use of the past tense should be avoided. MPEP § 
608.01(p)(II)(2007); see also Novo Nordisk Pharm., 424 F.3d at 1361. 
 79 See Nordberg, Inc. v. Telsmith, Inc., 82 F.3d 394, 397 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
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The Federal Circuit employed similar logic a couple of months 
later in Ferring v. Barr.80  In that case, Ferring’s patent application 
was rejected because of a prior art reference, but the rejection 
hinged on the determination of the word used in the prior art 
reference, and the inventors sought declarations to prove the 
meaning of this term was different.81  Although the Ferring 
inventors knew of the connections between the declarants and the 
patent applicant, and that the patent examiner had asked for non-
inventor affidavits, he failed to notify the patent examiner that four 
of the five declarations came from scientists that had been 
employed or received funding from Ferring.82  In so doing, the 
court found intent to deceive, as Ferring “should have known” that 
omitting the connections between declarants and the patent 
applicant was material.83  The problem with such rationale, 
however, is that the court had previously held that an individual 
cannot intend to deceive if there is no actual knowledge of the 
materiality of the omitted information,84 and there was no evidence 
here that the Ferring inventors knew or avoided warnings that the 
connections were material. 
The erosion of the intent standard continued with Purdue 
Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc.85  Here, Purdue’s 
failure to disclose to the Patent Office that a “surprising discovery” 
regarding dosage range formulation was based on insight rather 
than experimental data, and the trial court found this to be highly 
material and inferred intent from this high materiality.86  The 
Federal Circuit held that “[i]n a case such as this, when the 
materiality of the undisclosed information is relatively low, there is 
less basis for inferring intent from materiality alone.”87  Such 
rationale implied that if the court were to determine that 
information is moderately or highly material, intent could be 
 80 Ferring v. Barr, 437 F.3d 1181 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 81 Id. at 1183–84. 
 82 Id. at 1184. 
 83 Id. at 1191–92. 
 84 FMC Corp. v. Manitowac Co., 835 F.2d 1411, 1415 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
 85 Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharm. Inc., 438 F.3d 1123 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 86 Id. at 1134–35. 
 87 Id. 
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inferred based on materiality alone.88  This erosion continued with 
Kao Corp. v. Unilever U.S., Inc.,89 in which the trial court found 
materiality but no intent to deceive.90  In that case, inventors 
initially disclosed only some results to the examiner, presenting the 
previously omitted data a year later.91  Holding the omitted 
information material but finding no attempt to conceal the 
information, the trial court refrained from making a finding of 
intent to deceive.92  Although on appeal the Federal Circuit stated 
that it may have weighed the evidence differently given a blank 
slate, the court refused to second guess the district court’s 
decision,93 suggesting that it might well have affirmed a finding of 
inequitable conduct if the case had been decided differently. 
While Kingsdown has not been explicitly overruled,94 the post-
2003 cases relaxing the intent standard indicate—especially when 
viewed alongside the Federal Circuit’s decision to maintain the 
“reasonable examiner” test95—the Federal Circuit’s attempt to 
expand the scope of the inequitable conduct doctrine.  Such 
expansion lies in sharp contrast to the limiting reform called for by 
the Patent Office and Legislature. 
II. ANALYSIS OF INEQUITABLE CONDUCT ADJUDICATIONS 
As briefly discussed earlier in this Comment, the advantages of 
raising the inequitable conduct defense can lead to an over-
pleading of the defense.96  When an alleged patent infringer 
invokes the inequitable conduct defense, he stands the chance of 
having the patent rendered unenforceable against him,97 even if he 
 88 See Hanft & Kerns, supra note 64, at 4. 
 89 Kao Corp. v. Unilever U.S., Inc., 441 F.3d 963 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 90 Id. at 972. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 437 F.3d 1181, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 95 See Digital Control, 437 F.3d at 1316; supra text accompanying note 50. 
 96 See John F. Lynch, An Argument For Eliminating The Defense of Patent 
Unenforceability Based on Inequitable Conduct, 16 AIPLA Q.J. 7, 8 (1988). 
 97 See NAS study, supra note 1, at 121. 
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in fact infringed the patent.98  Perhaps almost as important, 
pleading inequitable conduct puts the patentee on the defensive 
and permits the alleged infringer to scrutinize the motives and 
conduct of the patent applicant, even providing him with access to 
documents protected by the attorney-client and work product 
privileges.99  Although inequitable conduct typically needs to be 
pled with particularity,100 often the accused infringer can seize 
upon inconsistencies uncovered through discovery in the produced 
documents to develop an adequate pleading.101 
Due to the ease of pleading the inequitable defense doctrine 
and the strong advantages of doing so, it is important to 
quantitatively understand the role inequitable conduct plays in 
patent litigation.  While it is difficult to quantify the number of 
times inequitable conduct is pled or how much discovery into 
inequitable conduct is permitted and completed, examining how 
patent disputes are ultimately adjudicated provides some insight 
into how the inequitable conduct defense is litigated and the extent 
to which pleading inequitable conduct affects the outcome of a 
case. 
Table 1 below sets forth the total number of reported patent 
decisions between 2000 and 2007, alongside a breakdown of how 
many of these decisions involved inequitable conduct 
determinations.102 
 98 See CHISUM, supra note 3, § 19.03[5][d] (“[A] patent may be valid and yet be 
rendered unenforceable for misuse or inequitable conduct.  Similarly, a valid patent may 
be (in the abstract) infringed . . . but there will be no liability to the patentee when the 
patent is unenforceable.” (quoting Gardco Mfg., Inc. v. Herst Lighting Co., 820 F.2d 
1209, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 1987)). 
 99 Lynch, supra note 96, at 8. 
 100 See CHISUM, supra note 3, § 19.03[6][b][ii]. 
 101 See Lynch, supra note 96, at 15–16. 
 102 See Kevin Mack, Note, Reforming Inequitable Conduct to Improve Patent Quality: 
Cleansing Unclean Hands, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 147, 155 tbl.1 (2006) (citing 
University of Houston Law Center, U.S. Patent Litigation Statistics, 
http://www.patstats.org (last visited Mar. 1, 2006) (providing statistical analysis of patent 
cases involving inequitable conduct from the years 2000–05)); University of Houston 
Law Center, U.S. Patent Litigation Statistics, Cumulative Caselist, 
http://www.patstats.org/Cumulative_Caselist_thru_2Q08.xls (last visited Oct. 7, 2008) 
[hereinafter Caselist] (listing the patent cases decided from 2005 through the second 
quarter of 2008); University of Houston Law Center, U.S. Patent Litigation Statistics, 
Decisions for 2007,  http://www.patstats.org/2007%20full%20year.htm (last visited Oct. 
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Table 1: Statistics Regarding Inequitable Conduct from  
2000–07103 
 
Year Number 
of 
Reported 
Patent 
Cases 
Total 
Number of 
Times 
Inequitable 
Conduct was 
Addressed 
by the 
Court104
Number of 
Times 
Patentee 
Prevailed 
(No 
Inequitable 
Conduct 
Found) 
Number of 
Times 
Alleged 
Infringer 
Prevailed 
(Inequitable 
Conduct 
Found) 
Percentage of 
Reported 
Patent Cases 
in which the 
Court Ruled 
Upon an 
Inequitable 
Conduct 
Defense105
2000 104 20 15 5 19 
2001 161 27 23 4 17 
2002 234 37 26 11 16 
2003 208 40 22 18 19 
2004 127 44 29 15 35 
2005 248 46 33 13 19 
2006 359 49 (43) 37 (32) 12 (11) 14 (12) 
2007 439 95 (65) 55 (45) 40 (20) 22 (15) 
 
 
7, 2008) [hereinafter 2007 Decisions] (detailing the decisions on patent cases for the year 
2007); University of Houston Law Center, U.S. Patent Litigation Statistics, Decisions for 
2006,  http://www.patstats.org/2006.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2008) [hereinafter 2006 
Decisions] (detailing the decisions on patent cases for the year 2006).  The tables were 
compiled with the raw data provided by the University of Houston Law Center in 
addition to the data provided in Mack, supra. 
 103 The numbers not in parentheses represent court decisions on inequitable conduct on 
a patent by patent basis, e.g., if a reported decision included two patents and the court 
decided inequitable conduct with respect to each patent this would be counted as two in 
the chart even though it is only in one case.  The numbers in parentheses represent the 
number of cases decided, irrespective of the number of patents upon which the court 
rendered a decision. 
 104 For each year, this figure is calculated by adding the number of times the patentee 
prevailed and the number of times the alleged infringer prevailed. 
 105 For each year, this figure is calculated by dividing the total number of times 
inequitable conduct was addressed by the court by the number of reported patent cases.  
The percentage is rounded to the nearest whole number. 
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The above table shows that, between 2000 and 2007, courts 
addressed, on average, inequitable conduct in less than 20% of all 
reported patent cases.106  This figure must be qualified, however, 
because it is almost impossible to ascertain the number of times 
inequitable conduct was pled, given that approximately 86% of 
patent cases settle107 and are therefore not captured in these 
statistics.  Interestingly, during 2006 and 2007, inequitable conduct 
was being addressed by the Court less frequently than the average 
for the time period of Table 1—in only 108 out of 798 cases—a 
mere 14% of the time.108 
It is equally important to observe that during the eight-year 
period reflected in Table 1, the alleged infringer prevailed against 
the patentee approximately one-third of the time with the court 
finding inequitable conduct was committed by the patentee.109  
When looking at the years 2006 to 2007, inequitable conduct was 
found in about 4% of all patent cases litigated—31 times out of 
798 cases.110  While this figure does not take into account the 
number of times the defense was raised, it seems to indicate that 
there is not some massive failure of the system to reign in 
 106 See Mack, supra note 102, at 156; Caselist, supra note 102; 2007 Decisions, supra 
note 102; 2006 Decisions, supra note 102. 
 107 See University of Houston Law Center, U.S. Patent Litigation Statistics, Patent Case 
Dispositions, 2005 to 2007, http://www.patstats.org/2005-2007_FY_PATENT_CASE_ 
DISPOSITIONS_(corrected).doc (last visited Oct. 7, 2008) (detailing patent case 
dispositions for the fiscal years 2005–07). 
 108 See Caselist, supra note 102; 2007 Decisions, supra note 102; 2006 Decisions, 
supra note 102.  The number 798 was obtained by totaling the number of cases reported 
from the second column and the number 108 was obtained by adding 43 and 65 from the 
third column.  The numbers in parenthesis were used because they represent the number 
of cases rather than a determination on a per patent basis.  Each percentage is rounded to 
the nearest whole number. 
 109 During the years 2000 to 2007, out of the 358 times the Court ruled on inequitable 
conduct, the Court found there to be inequitable conduct by the patentee 118 times, or 
33% of the time. See Mack, supra note 102, at 156; Caselist, supra note 102; 2007 
Decisions, supra note 102; 2006 Decisions, supra note 102. 
 110 This figure was calculated by dividing the number of times the alleged infringer 
prevailed (from column 5) over the number of reported patent cases (from column 2) for 
the years 2006 and 2007.  The percentage is rounded to the nearest whole number.  See 
Caselist, supra note 102; 2007 Decisions, supra note 102; 2006 Decisions, supra note 
102. 
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misconduct and that there are a relatively small number of patents 
acquired through improper means.111 
Using the same data source as Table 1, Table 2 below breaks 
down how the courts have treated inequitable conduct cases 
between 2000 and 2006.112 
 
Table 2: Breakdown of Decisions on Inequitable Conduct from 
2000–06113 
 
 Patentee 
Prevails 
Alleged 
Infringer 
Prevails 
% of Time 
Alleged 
Infringer 
Prevails114
Appellate 
Affirmances 
57 23 29 
Appellate 
Reversals 
14 3 18 
Total Appellate 
Decisions115  
71 26 27 
 
 111 It is difficult to say the actual number of “bad patents” that applicants have 
committed inequitable conduct during the procurement of the patent because only about 
2% of patents are litigated, however it provides insight into the overall success rate of the 
inequitable conduct defense and the number of patents that are potentially acquired 
through improper means. 
 112 The data for 2007 is now available. See 2007 Decisions, supra note 102.  According 
to the 2007 data, the trial court, when ruling after a trial, found inequitable conduct 31% 
of the time, while the Federal Circuit, ruling on appeal, found inequitable conduct 75% of 
the time. Id.  The percentages are rounded to the nearest whole number. 
 113 See 2006 Decisions, supra note 102; University of Houston Law Center, U.S. Patent 
Litigation Statistics, Decisions for 2005, http://www.patstats.org/2005rev2.htm (last 
visited Oct. 7, 2008) [hereinafter 2005 Decisions] (detailing the decisions on patent cases 
for the year 2005); University of Houston Law Center, U.S. Patent Litigation Statistics, 
Decisions for 2000–04, http://www.patstats.org/2000-04.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2008) 
[hereinafter 2000–04 Decisions] (detailing the decisions on patent cases for the years 
2000 to 2004). 
 114 For each category, this figure is calculated by dividing the number of times the 
alleged infringer prevails into the total number of decisions for each category, the sum of 
the number of times the alleged infringer prevails and the number of times the patentee 
prevails. 
 115 For each category, this figure is the sum of appellate affirmances and appellate 
reversals. 
VOL19_BOOK2_BROWN 2/18/2009  3:16:08 AM 
610 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 19:593 
Trial Court 
Rulings After 
Trial 
64 37 37 
Trial Court 
Summary 
Judgment 
50 15 23 
It is interesting to note that during the aforementioned seven 
years, the Federal Circuit found inequitable conduct 27% of the 
time while the trial court, when ruling after a trial, found 
inequitable conduct 37% of the time.116  Such variance indicates 
that although the Federal Circuit has tended—particularly 
recently117—to use a broader standard of inequitable conduct than 
that proposed by the Patent Office and Legislature, it is still less 
willing than are the trial courts to find inequitable conduct and is 
not hesitant to reverse lower court findings of inequitable conduct, 
which it has done 82% of the time.118  What remains to be seen is 
whether—and the degree to which—the Federal Circuit’s recent 
trend of broadening the inequitable conduct standard will affect 
future decisions and the percentage of inequitable conduct findings 
it overrules. 
The statistics set forth in Table 2 also provide some insight into 
the number of times alleged patent infringers made meritless 
claims of inequitable conduct.  For a patentee to prevail on a 
summary judgment motion, a court would need to find that the 
patentee did not—as a matter of law—commit inequitable 
conduct.119  As indicated in Table 2 above, the courts made such a 
 
 116 See 2006 Decisions, supra note 102; 2005 Decisions, supra note 113; 2000–04 
Decisions, supra note 113.  
 117 See supra text accompanying notes 64–93. 
 118 See 2006 Decisions, supra note 102; 2005 Decisions, supra note 113; 2000–04 
Decisions, supra note 113.  The 2007 data is not dispositive on the subject, as only one 
decision was reversed by the Federal Circuit on appeal.  However, that one reversal was 
in favor of the alleged infringer. See 2007 Decisions, supra note 102. 
 119 See CHISUM, supra note 3, § 19.03[5][c] n.13 (citing Paragon Podiatry Lab., Inc. v. 
KLM Labs., Inc., 984 F.2d 1182, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“While our precedent urges 
caution in the grant of summary judgment respecting a defense of inequitable conduct, 
summary judgment is not foreclosed. . . .  [W]e must decide whether the evidence 
respecting culpable intent makes the fact reasonably inferable either way, or whether the 
evidence is so one-sided that the factual issue of intent may be decided as a matter of 
law.”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) (“The judgment sought should be rendered if the 
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finding 77% of the time.120  While this high figure appears to 
suggest an over-pleading of the inequitable conduct defense, the 
figure must be considered in the context of all adjudications 
because in a high percentage of cases the court does not decide the 
issue of inequitable conduct on summary judgment.  When 
accounting for all court decisions during this period, only 19% (or 
one in five) inequitable conduct pleadings appear to be meritless, 
i.e., they were thrown out on summary judgment.121  This lower 
figure, though certainly indicating a prevalence of meritless claims 
of inequitable conduct, does not indicate an epidemic of over-
pleading the defense. 
The conundrum with eliminating the inequitable conduct 
standard (or moving to a “but for” standard) is that not all cases 
described had both validity and inequitable conduct 
determinations.  In fact, during 2006–07, courts made both 
inequitable conduct and validity determinations in only 45% of 
cases where the court found inequitable conduct.122  Given the 
complexities of litigation, it is difficult to surmise why no validity 
determination was made in the remaining 55% of cases where 
inequitable conduct was found.  What is clear, however, is that 
some percentage of those 55% of cases had a valid inequitable 
conduct defense, but not a strong enough invalidity defense to 
merit adjudication on the issue.  This means that more 
pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.”); Digital Control, Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 
1309, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“In order to prevail at the summary judgment stage, the 
moving party must show that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that no 
reasonable jury could find against the moving party.”). 
 120 This figure is obtained by taking the number of times the patentee prevailed on 
summary judgment (50) divided by the number of summary judgment decisions by the 
Court (65).  See 2006 Decisions, supra note 102; 2005 Decisions, supra note 113; 2000–
04 Decisions, supra note 113. 
 121 This figure is obtained by taking the number of times the patentee prevailed on 
summary judgment (50) divided by the total number of appellate decisions (71+26), the 
total trial court decisions (64+37), and the total number of summary judgment decisions 
by the Court (50+15). See 2006 Decisions, supra note 102; 2005 Decisions, supra note 
113; 2000–04 Decisions, supra note 113. 
 122 This percentage is calculated by dividing the total number of cases where 
inequitable conduct was found (31) by the number of cases where the court found both 
inequitable conduct and the patent in question to be invalid (14). See infra Table 3. 
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questionable—and perhaps even reprehensible—actions would go 
unpunished if invalid claims were a prerequisite to pleading 
inequitable conduct because the court never reaches the inequitable 
conduct defense since the claims are determined to be valid despite 
the patentee’s actions. 
Table 3 below sets forth court decisions where both inequitable 
conduct and validity were ruled upon for the 2006–07 period. 
 
Table 3: Findings of Inequitable Conduct versus Validity 
Findings 2006–07123 
 
 Patent Found 
Valid 
Patent Found 
Invalid 
Total 
Cases 
Inequitable conduct 
found 
0 14 31 
No Inequitable 
conduct found 
32 10 77 
 
This table is significant because one of the proposed reforms to 
the inequitable conduct standard is to make it a strict “but for” 
standard, meaning that inequitable conduct is only considered if 
one or more claims are found invalid.124  By analyzing Court 
decisions where both invalidity and inequitable conduct were ruled 
upon, the impact of this type of standard can be understood.  The 
first row of Table 3 shows that a patent was never found valid 
when inequitable conduct was deemed to have occurred.  This 
demonstrates a high correlation between a finding of claim 
invalidity and inequitable conduct.  Since the patent has wholly or 
partially been found invalid already, the “but for” standard may not 
translate into much punishment for the patentee, except if 
remaining valid claims are held unenforceable.  This high 
correlation between invalidity and inequitable conduct provides 
some credence to eliminating the inequitable conduct defense all 
 
 123 See 2007 Decisions, supra note 102; 2006 Decisions, supra note 102. 
 124 This “but for” standard is similar to the judicial “but for” test described above. See 
supra text accompanying notes 27–33. 
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together, since if the patentee committed inequitable conduct, then 
the patent is probably invalid. 
An examination of another data source compiled from 244 
federal district court opinions involving inequitable conduct 
between 1995 and 2004125 largely confirms the statistical results 
presented above.  Of the 244 court opinions, 119 (approximately 
half) were summary judgment decisions.126  Of these, the court 
declined approximately 50% of the time to grant summary 
judgment motions, finding that the allegations warranted a trial.127  
In the remaining 50% of the summary judgment motions the court 
ruled on the issue finding inequitable conduct in ten cases and no 
inequitable conduct in 50 cases (42% of the 119 summary 
judgment decisions).128  In other words, between 1995 and 2004, 
42% of all summary judgment motions alleging inequitable 
conduct appear to be the result of an over-pleading of the defense 
because there were no factual questions and the law did not 
support a finding of inequitable conduct.  When those cases 
rejecting summary judgment are removed from the analysis, the 
1995 to 2004 sample shows that 83% of summary judgment 
motions found no inequitable conduct, compared to 76% of the 
summary judgment motions between 2000 and 2006 discussed 
above.129 
In total, between 1995 and 2004, inequitable conduct was 
found 30% of the time (in 37 out of 125 cases).130  When 
compared with the trial court decisions in Table 3 above in which 
 125 Katherine Nolan-Stevaux, Note, Inequitable Conduct Claims in the 21st Century: 
Combating the Plague, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 147, 160–61 (2005) (using the search 
terms “patent & ‘inequitable conduct’” in the Westlaw database of federal IP district 
court cases and excluding preliminary injunction motions). 
 126 Id. at 161. 
 127 Id. at 161 tbl.1. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Even more interesting is that 50 out of 244 district court decisions were seemingly 
without merit (about 20%). See id.  This aligns with the data presented in supra Table 2, 
where 50 out of 263 decisions fell in the same category. See supra text accompanying 
note 120.  While this is not a statistically significant comparison, it does show 
consistency in the numbers. 
 130  Nolan-Stevaux, supra note 125, at 162. 
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inequitable conduct was found 37% of the time,131 it becomes clear 
that for over fourteen years, the trend of such cases is in favor of 
finding no inequitable conduct occ
Table 4 below sets forth court decisions where both inequitable 
conduct and validity were ruled upon between 1995 and 2004.132 
 
Table 4: District Court Findings of Inequitable Conduct versus 
Validity 1995–2004133 
 
 Patent Found 
Valid 
Patent Found 
Invalid 
Total 
Cases 
Inequitable Conduct 
Found 
2 16 47 
No Inequitable 
Conduct Found 
56 18 138 
 
Interestingly, the data of Table 4 supports the same two 
observations drawn from the data of Table 3 above.  First, 
patentees that commit inequitable conduct typically have patents 
that are invalid when the court decides both issues, and second, 
over half the time the court does not decide both inequitable 
conduct and validity of a patent.  The first observation supports the 
conclusion that entirely eliminating inequitable conduct may not 
change who is punished any more than using a “but for” standard 
because a patentee that commits inequitable conduct usually has 
invalid patent claims.  The second observation supports the 
conclusion that requiring invalid claims to plead inequitable 
 
 131 Again this is not statistically significant because the 1995 to 2004 data set did not 
consider later determinations by higher courts, while the 2000 to 2006 data set did 
consider appellate decisions. 
 132 Id. at 163.  The data set presented in supra Table 4 is comparable to the data 
presented in supra Table 3.   However, supra Table 4 represents a ten year period rather 
than a two year period, and it also considers only a sampling of district court opinions for 
that particular ten year timeframe. 
 133 See Nolan-Stevaux, supra note 125, at 125–63.  Note the difference in totals 
between supra Table 4 and the 244 total cases Nolan-Stevaux considered is due to the 
fact that the courts declined to grant summary judgment in a portion of the cases and so 
no decision was made. See Nolan-Stevaux, supra note 125, at 161–63. 
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conduct may severely restrict the number of times inequitable 
conduct is found by the court.134  This is shown in Table 4 by the 
courts only deciding about 38% of the time to determine validity 
when a finding of inequitable conduct occurred.135  In rationalizing 
these two observations, it is important to consider that although 
those that commit inequitable conduct typically also have invalid 
claims, this conclusion might not hold true if the courts considered 
invalidity in all cases where inequitable conduct was found to 
occur. 
While the above data seems to indicate that inequitable conduct 
is plead more often than needed, it does not appear to be a 
“plague”136 or “appearing in nearly every patent suit”137 as was 
previously thought.  It is possible that relaxing the intent element 
of the inequitable conduct standard could provide a greater 
incentive to raise the defense more often, but it is extremely 
difficult to know how the courts would react.  Currently, the 
Federal Circuit is more likely to reverse or find no inequitable 
conduct despite the anecdotal evidence suggesting otherwise.  The 
statistical data also confirms that a policy determination needs to 
be made about what kind of behaviors should be discouraged and 
the practical costs of litigating such a standard. 
III. POLICY RATIONALES FOR REFORMING THE INEQUITABLE 
CONDUCT STANDARD 
Calls to reform the inequitable conduct standard were 
spearheaded by reports from the Federal Trade Commission (the 
“FTC”) in 2003 and the National Academy of Sciences (the 
“NAS”) in 2004.138  The FTC report suggested that applicants 
submit statements of relevance regarding their prior art references 
to point the patent examiners to the best pieces of prior art, though 
 134 See Nolan-Stevaux, supra note 125, at 163. 
 135 This figure is obtained by dividing the number of times a validity determination was 
made (18) by the total of cases where inequitable conduct was found (47). See supra 
Table 4. 
 136 Burlington Indus. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 137 Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
 138 FTC report, supra note 1; NAS study, supra note 1. 
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the report simultaneously acknowledged its concern that such a 
requirement might create “dubious allegations” of inequitable 
conduct because it could lead to accusations of misrepresenting the 
importance of pieces of prior art.139  The NAS report 
recommended eliminating the inequitable conduct doctrine or, at 
the very least, making legislative changes to its implementation.140  
Such suggested changes included not inferring intent from 
materiality of information, providing de novo review of inequitable 
conduct charges on appeal, awarding attorney’s fees to a prevailing 
patentee, and/or referring misconduct to the Patent Office for re-
examination and disciplinary action.141  While the NAS 
recommendations appear drastic, the report deemed such sweeping 
changes necessary, as the NAS found the subjective nature of 
inequitable conduct to be among the chief factors increasing the 
cost of litigation and decreasing the predictability of patent 
infringement litigation.142 
In addition to the FTC and NAS reports, the House of 
Representatives and the Senate held hearings on the topic of patent 
reform.143  The hearings garnered speakers and submissions from a 
diverse and knowledgeable field.  This Article have analyzes 
below portions of these hearings144 to illustrate some of the main 
positions and policy rationales taken by various constituents 
regarding inequitable conduct. 
The Intellectual Property Owners Association (the “IPO”) took 
a position contrary to the NAS report, questioning whether any 
 139 See FTC report, supra note 1, at 12–13. 
 140 See NAS study, supra note 1, at 123. 
 141 Id. 
 142 See NAS study, supra note 1, at 117. 
 143 See Patent Reform: The Future of American Innovation: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) [hereinafter Senate Hearings], available at 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings; Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 
2795 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005) [hereinafter Amendment]; Committee Print 
Regarding Patent Quality Improvement: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the 
Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005) 
[hereinafter Committee Print Hearings].  
 144 See infra text accompanying notes 145–69. 
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bility to a 
finding of infringement.  
 
legislative reforms were necessary.145  The IPO did not support 
any legislative changes that would narrow the inequitable conduct 
standard or reduce the amount of prior art submitted to the Patent 
Office, but was instead interested only in legislation that would 
make patent applicants more comfortable submitting to the Patent 
Office explanations and opinions regarding prior art, thereby 
increasing the quality of patents issued by the Patent Office.146  
The Business Software Alliance (“BSA”) also expressed concern 
with any changes that would increase the threshold for a finding of 
inequitable conduct, as a patent applicant’s incentive to be open 
and honest with the Patent Office would be undermined if bad acts 
were not being punished in litigation.147  The BSA therefore 
suggested that patent litigation cases be bifurcated and inequitable 
conduct not be adjudicated until after liability for infringement had 
been ruled upon,148 since additional litigation may be avoided if 
the alleged infringer prevailed on other counts (such as invalidity) 
or if the dispute was settled. 
Barr Laboratories, a generic drug company, was very 
concerned with the Legislature’s proposed adoption of a “but for” 
standard of materiality and the requirement that all misconduct be 
committed knowingly.149  Barr maintained that this would 
establish a “nearly impossible-to-meet standard for proving a 
violation of the duty of candor,”150 pointing in support of its 
assertion to a series of Federal Circuit cases acknowledging that 
direct evidence of a knowing intent to deceive rarely exists.151  
Barr further pointed out that the adoption of a “but for” standard 
would change at least four recent decisions relating to 
pharmaceuticals from a finding of patent unenforcea
152
 145 See Committee Print Hearings, supra note 143, at 13 (statement of J. Jeffrey 
Hawley, Legal Division Vice President and Director, Legal Staff, Eastman Kodak Co.). 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. at 24 (statement of Richard J. Lutton, Jr., Chief Patent Counsel, Apple Inc.). 
 148 Id. 
 149 Amendment, supra note 143, at 224 (letter to the Honorable Lamar Smith from 
Christine J. Siwik on behalf of Barr Laboratories, Inc.). 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. at 224–25. 
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The American Bar Association’s IP Law Section (hereinafter 
the “Section”) rallied against any dilution of the “duty of candor 
and good faith” standard because the ex parte nature of the patent 
application process mandated a strong standard to ensure good 
faith dealings between the patent applicant and the examiner.153  
However, the Section, along with the biotech company Genentech, 
supported reforms that would affirmatively encourage more 
meaningful and valuable disclosures to patent examiners.154  To 
this end, both the Section and Genentech endorsed a legislative 
reform proposal that would allow inequitable conduct to be pled 
only when a patent claim was found invalid and the alleged 
misconduct was causally related to the invalid claim—that is, the 
Section and Genentech also supported implementing a “but for” 
standard.155  In support of its position, the Section noted that a “but 
for” standard is applied in other types of fraud cases, and that in 
such cases, misrepresentations or omissions are only material when 
they would affect the outcome of the case.156  The Section wanted 
the same standard applied in inequitable conduct cases, since 
misrepresentations or omissions by the patent applicant that do not 
affect the outcome of the case, even if reprehensible, do not inflict 
harm on the accused infringer because these misrepresentations or 
omissions do not change the patentability of the subject matter.157  
The Section also proposed eliminating the “all or nothing” aspect 
for a successful holding of inequitable conduct, in which a court 
punishes a patentee by finding the whole patent unenforceable—
even if the misconduct only relates to a portion of the claims.158  
Instead, the Section favored assessing a penalty that is in 
proportion to the seriousness of the offense,159 which could reduce 
the incentives to raise the defense in borderline cases. 
Both the Section and Jon Dudas, the Patent Office’s Director, 
noted in the legislative hearings that the current inequitable 
 153 Committee Print Hearings, supra note 143, at 47 (statement of William L. LaFuze, 
Chair, Section of Intellectual Property Law, American Bar Association). 
 154 Id. at 49. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. at 86 (attachment IPL Section NRC Response). 
 158 Id. at 87. 
 159 Id. 
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conduct standard perversely affects the patent application process 
by causing patent applicants to over-submit prior art references and 
under-disclose the relevance of prior art references.160  Many 
patent applicants submit massive amounts of prior art references in 
Information Disclosure Statements (“IDS”) to avoid any later 
inequitable conduct allegations that they omitted any material 
information, but in so doing bury relevant references among those 
having little or no significance.161  At the same time, patent 
applicants avoid making any statements regarding prior art out of 
fear that any statements regarding the substance of prior art will 
become the basis for a later claim of misrepresentation.162  In some 
cases, patent applicants will avoid searching and/or gaining 
knowledge of possible prior art information in a desire to avoid 
committing inequitable conduct, however this means the Patent 
Office is deprived of possibly relevant prior art.163  A 2005 review 
undertaken by the Patent Office found that over one-half of patent 
applications contained either no submitted references or over 20 
submitted references.164  As recognized by the Section and Mr. 
Dudas, a doctrine that encourages over-submission and under-
disclosure does little to assure the Patent Office’s accurate and 
complete review of patent applications and leads only to 
inconsistent examination, especially in the fast-paced technology 
areas.165 
As a result of the Patent Office’s concerns outlined above, Mr. 
Dudas urged Congress to amend the doctrines of inequitable 
conduct and unenforceability to ensure that patent applicants are 
not discouraged from sharing relevant information with the Patent 
Office.166  To this end, Mr. Dudas suggested that a court’s finding 
of intent be wholly separated from a finding of materiality, and that 
intent not be found without proof that a patent applicant made a 
 160  Senate Hearings, supra note 143 (testimony of Honorable Jon W. Dudas Under 
Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office); Committee Print Hearings, supra note 143, at 48. 
 161 Senate Hearings, supra note 143; Committee Print Hearings, supra note 143, at 48. 
 162 Senate Hearings, supra note 143; Committee Print Hearings, supra note 143, at 48. 
 163 See Senate Hearings, supra note 143. 
 164 Id. 
 165 Id.; Committee Print Hearings, supra note 143, at 49.  
 166 Senate Hearings, supra note 143. 
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knowing misrepresentation with intent to deceive.167  With respect 
to defining materiality, Mr. Dudas proposed that Congress limit the 
courts to using only the Patent Office’s definition of materiality, as 
set forth in its Rule 56 1992 amendment.168  This last proposal, of 
course, signaled the Patent Office’s disapproval of the Federal 
Circuit’s decision in Digital Control to not defer to the Patent 
Office’s rulemaking authority. 
Although, as illustrated above, different industry groups 
proposed different types of legislative reform, all shared the 
general consensus that patent applicants should have a robust duty 
of candor and good faith to increase the quality of patents issued 
and many considered the current inequitable conduct standard ripe 
for reform due to its inherent uncertainty, perverse barriers to 
patent examination, and high litigation costs.169  The question that 
each of these groups struggled with—and came up with different 
answers to—was how to encourage patent applicants to be more 
forthcoming with the Patent Office, while ensuring an effective 
enforcement mechanism for those who engaged in misconduct.  
Part IV examines Congress’s ongoing struggle to strike the 
appropriate balance between these two objectives. 
IV. THE PATENT REFORM ACT 
Following the substantial reports by the FTC and the NAS, on 
June 8, 2005, Congressman Lamar S. Smith introduced into the 
House of Representatives the Patent Reform Act of 2005.170  This 
bill proposed many of the recommendations suggested by the FTC 
and NAS, and sought to resolve the dilemma of the inequitable 
conduct standard by codifying a duty of candor and good faith171 
and increasing the burden for proving inequitable conduct by 
implementing an objective “but for” standard.172 
 167 Id. 
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. 
 170 H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 171 See id. § 5(a). 
 172 See id. 
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Most importantly, the 2005 bill eliminated the judicial 
equitable conduct defense and granted solely to the Patent Office 
the power to investigate inequitable conduct, mandating that courts 
defer to the Patent Office’s judgment.173  To find inequitable 
conduct, the Patent Office needed to show, with clear and 
convincing evidence, that: 
(1) the individual failed to disclose information or 
misrepresented information; 
(2) the information not disclosed was material or, in 
the case of a misrepresentation, the 
misrepresentation was material; 
(3) the individual had knowledge of the materiality 
of the information not disclosed or, in the case of a 
misrepresentation, of the misrepresentation and 
materiality of the misrepresentation; and 
(4) the individual had the intent to deceive or 
mislead.174 
This standard would have completely overhauled the then-
existing intent element by requiring that the patent applicant have 
actual knowledge of the materiality of the information not 
disclosed or misrepresented.  Also, rather than permitting an 
inference of intent, the Patent Office could not make a finding of 
inequitable conduct without direct proof of the patent applicant’s 
intent to deceive or mislead. 
It is vital to note that the 2005 bill would not have even 
permitted the alleged infringer to plead inequitable conduct until 
one or more claims were found invalid and the alleged infringer 
needed to show how the alleged misconduct resulted in an invalid 
claim.  The bill further restricted the alleged infringer’s pleading of 
inequitable conduct by requiring a showing that the alleged fraud 
was attributable to the patent owner175 (that is the patent owner had 
engaged in or directed the patent attorney or agent to engage in the 
misconduct).  While the purpose of this requirement was likely to 
 173 See id. 
 174 Id. 
 175 See id. 
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encourage patent agents and attorneys to engage in more 
meaningful discourse regarding prior art with the Patent Office, its 
practical effect was to essentially eliminate the inequitable conduct 
defense, as alleged infringers would find it virtually impossible to 
prove that the patent owner was perpetrating the misconduct. 
The 2005 bill was never passed into law.  Instead, House Bill 
1908 was introduced into the House of Representatives the 
following year, and an amended version of this bill was ultimately 
passed as the Patent Reform Act of 2007 (the “2007 Act”).176  
Although numerous aspects of this amended bill mirrored the 
proposed 2005 bill, House Bill 1908 proposed a radically different 
inequitable conduct standard.  The 2007 Act codified the 
inequitable conduct defense and required the patent challenger to 
prove inequitable conduct by “clear and convincing evidence” that 
material information was misrepresented or omitted with the intent 
to mislead or deceive the patent examiner.177  The Act went on to 
provide that information is material if: 
(i) a reasonable examiner would have made a prima 
facie finding of unpatentability, or maintained a 
finding of unpatentability, of one or more of the 
patent claims based on the information, and the 
information is not cumulative to information 
already of record or previously considered by the 
Office; or 
(ii) information that is otherwise material refutes or 
is inconsistent with a position the applicant takes in 
opposing a rejection of the claim or in asserting an 
argument of patentability.178 
Apart from materiality, the 2007 Act required separate proof of 
intent and to prove 
specific facts beyond materiality of the information 
misrepresented or not disclosed must be proven that 
establish the intent of the person to mislead or 
deceive the examiner by the actions of the person.  
 176 H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 177 Id. § 12(b)(4). 
 178 Id. 
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Facts support an intent to mislead or deceive if they 
show circumstances that indicate conscious or 
deliberate behavior on the part of the person to not 
disclose material information or to submit false 
material information in order to mislead or deceive 
the examiner.179 
The materiality component of the 2007 Act is somewhat 
similar to the definition set forth in the Patent Office’s Rule 56 and 
that the Federal Circuit rejected in Digital Control.180  However, 
the 2007 Act’s proposed materiality standard differs significantly 
from Rule 56 in one important regard.  By providing that 
information is material if a reasonable patent examiner would have 
“maintained a finding of unpatentability,”181 the 2007 Act 
broadens Rule 56 to include situations such as when a 
misstatement is made in a declaration and the examiner removes 
the rejection because of the declaration.  In so doing, the 2007 Act 
creates a materiality standard that is more akin to the reasonable 
examiner standard182 than to the Rule 56 standard, thereby keeping 
the standard relatively in line with current case law precedent. 
In sharp contrast, the intent component of the 2007 Act differs 
markedly from current judicial precedent.  As discussed in detail 
above, pursuant to current case law, after threshold levels of 
materiality and intent have been shown, a court will balance the 
evidence of materiality and intent to determine whether the facts 
support a finding of inequitable conduct.183  By separating intent 
from materiality, the 2007 Act would not permit the courts to 
engage in any such balancing.  Instead, the patent challenger would 
need to prove “specific facts beyond materiality of the information 
misrepresented or not disclosed”184 to support a finding of intent.  
Such facts would need to show circumstances indicating the 
applicant’s conscious or deliberate omission or misrepresentation 
 179 Id. (emphasis added). 
 180 Digital Control, Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 
2006). 
 181 H.R. 1908 § 12(b)(4). 
 182 See infra text accompanying notes 192–201. 
 183 Baxter Int’l Inc. v. McGaw, Inc., 149 F.3d 1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 184 H.R. 1908 § 12(b)(4). 
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of material information,185 such as an applicant’s disregard for 
warnings that material information exists or a cultivation of 
ignorance to avoid actual knowledge. 
This intent standard would likely lead to different Federal 
Circuit case outcomes.  For example, in Novo Nordisk 
Pharmaceuticals,186 the court inferred intent to deceive when a 
Dutch inventor wrote in the past tense.187  Under the 2007 Act’s 
proposed intent standard, however, the court could not have found 
intent to deceive, as there existed no facts showing the inventor’s 
conscious or deliberate attempt to write the final step in the wrong 
tense.  In this way, then, the proposed intent standard set forth in 
the 2007 Act is a more objective determination than the standard 
currently utilized by the courts, and is a determination that will 
force the courts to find “conscious or deliberate behavior” without 
relying on materiality.188 
In another sharp deviation from current judicial precedent, the 
2007 Act rejects the Federal Circuit’s current “all or nothing” 
remedy of patent unenforceability in the event inequitable conduct 
is found, in favor of a number of potential remedies for inequitable 
conduct, depending on the particular circumstances of a case.  
These remedies include: (1) denying an injunction and allowing 
only a reasonable royalty for damages; (2) “[h]olding the claims-
in-suit, or the claims involved in the inequitable conduct, 
unenforceable[; (3)] [h]olding the patent unenforceable[;] and/or 
[(4)] holding the claims of a related patent unenforceable.”189  A 
court’s imposition of a variety of different remedies depending 
upon the factual situation presented to it could eliminate some of 
the advantages of pleading inequitable conduct, because for 
borderline cases of inequitable conduct, the alleged infringer could 
prevail on the defense, yet still be liable for infringement and owe 
a reasonable royalty to the patentee.  In another instance, the court 
might hold only the claims that issued due to the misconduct 
unenforceable, which leaves other claims of the patent enforceable 
 185 Id. 
 186 Novo Nordisk Pharm. Inc. v. Bio-Tech. Gen. Corp., 424 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 187 Id. at 1359–60. 
 188 H.R. 1908 § 12(b)(4) . 
 189 Id. 
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against the infringer.  Although not all or nothing remedies, each 
would still serve the equitable function of punishing the patentee 
who committed the inequitable conduct and would provide judges 
with an arguably easier way of deciding borderline cases and 
meting out appropriate punishment. 
Important to note is that the pending Senate version of the 
Patent Reform Bill, Senate Bill 1145, also has a section addressing 
inequitable conduct.190  The Senate’s version of the bill provides 
for nearly identical remedies as does the House of Representative’s 
bill, with the only difference being that the Senate version does not 
permit a court to hold claims of a related patent unenforceable.191  
The inequitable standard proposed by the Senate’s bill, however, 
differs markedly from the standard proposed in the House of 
Representative’s bill.  Unlike House Bill 1908, Senate Bill 1145 
largely codifies the existing judicial inequitable conduct standard.  
Under the Senate’s version of the 2007 Act, information is material 
if: “(1) a reasonable patent examiner would consider such 
information important in deciding whether to allow the patent 
application; and (2) such information is not cumulative to 
information already of record in the application.”192  These 
materiality requirements are a codification of the reasonable 
examiner standard currently employed by the courts coupled with 
the judicially oft-used doctrine of not allowing cumulative 
information to be considered.193  Given that the House bill 
provides an objective materiality test that is somewhat close in 
scope, the final law, if passed, will likely be very similar to the 
current House and Senate proposals. 
The Senate’s version of the bill also appears to codify the 
Kingsdown standard of intent194 by permitting intent to be inferred 
so long as it is “not . . . based solely on the gross negligence of the 
patent owner or its representative, or on the materiality of the 
 190 S. 1145, 110th Cong. § 12 (2007). 
 191 Id.; H.R. 1908 § 12(b)(4). 
 192 S. 1145 § 12. 
 193 See Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1582 
(Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 194 Kingsdown Med. Consultants v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 (Fed. Cir. 1988); 
see supra text accompanying note 68. 
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information misrepresented or not disclosed.”195  In so doing, 
Senate Bill 1145 adopts the Kingsdown standard of intent and 
implies a knowledge requirement.  Although the Senate’s version 
of the bill also separates the materiality determination from the 
intent determination, it does not require proof that the 
misrepresentation was knowing.196  In this way, then, the Senate’s 
version of the 2007 Act provides a broader test for finding intent 
than House Bill 1908, but one that would still likely curtail the 
Federal Circuit’s current trend of relaxing the intent standard. 
Despite the differences that exist between the Senate and 
House of Representatives versions of the 2007 Act, both represent 
a radical shift away from the severely narrowed inequitable 
conduct standard that was proposed in the 2005 bill.197  At the 
same time, however, both versions of the 2007 Act propose a 
variety of remedies intended to punish those who have engaged in 
inequitable conduct.198  By proposing a broader standard along 
with a host of potential remedies, it appears that the most recent 
versions of the 2007 Act have attempted to strike a compromise 
that would remove some of the incentives of over-pleading 
inequitable conduct, especially in questionable borderline cases, 
without severely narrowing the inequitable conduct standard. 
CONCLUSION 
As the statistics presented in this article make clear, inequitable 
conduct is not a plague upon the courts but, rather, a defense that is 
pled in a mere 20% of patent infringement cases.199  That said, and 
as indicated by the fact that courts dismiss inequitable conduct 
claims on summary judgment 50% of the time,200 inequitable 
conduct remains an over-pled defense.  Such over-pleading, as 
discussed earlier, stems from the ease by which an alleged patent 
 195 S. 1145 § 12. 
 196 Cf. id. 
 197 H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 5(a) (2005). 
 198 See H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 12(b) (2007); S. 1145 § 12. 
 199 See supra Table 1.  This percentage is only counting those cases that go to trial or 
where the issue is decided on summary judgment. 
 200 See supra Table 2 and corresponding description. 
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infringer can raise the defense and the immense rewards of 
successfully doing so (namely, avoiding a patent infringement 
finding).201 
In an effort to curb the number of meritless claims of 
inequitable conduct brought by alleged patent infringers, industry 
groups and the legislature have spent a great deal of time and effort 
proposing ways to reform the inequitable conduct standard.  The 
ultimate problem with all of the proposals to date, however, is that 
they seek to adjust the standard by which inequitable conduct 
claims are adjudged instead of removing the incentives of pleading 
the defense.  In this way, although each of the proposed reforms 
may ultimately make it more difficult for an alleged patent 
infringer to prevail on an inequitable conduct claim, the alleged 
infringer remains free—and it remains in the alleged infringer’s 
best interest—to make such a pleading.  Perhaps, then, the solution 
lies not in modifying the inequitable conduct standard but in 
modifying the procedural paradigm in which such claims are 
brought.  That is, perhaps the simplest and yet most prudent 
approach to bringing about needed reform would be to leave the 
inequitable standard as it is currently applied by the courts and 
simply award attorneys’ fees, in whole or in part, whenever an 
alleged patent infringer loses an inequitable conduct summary 
judgment motion.  Such a legislative provision would significantly 
reduce meritless claims of inequitable conduct without mandating 
that the courts apply a standard that they did not choose. 
Interestingly, existing patent law already provides for the 
award of attorneys’ fees in “exceptional cases,”202 though such 
fees are rarely awarded in cases involving inequitable conduct.  
Although an inequitable conduct case before the Patent Office 
qualifies as an “exceptional case,”203 a prevailing party must show 
an egregious case of misconduct with clear and convincing 
evidence to be entitled to attorneys’ fees204—a burden that is rarely 
met.205  While district courts have, between 1995 and 2004, 
 201 See supra text accompanying notes 96–101. 
 202 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2006). 
 203 Id. 
 204 Nolan-Stevaux, supra note 125, at 168. 
 205 Stevenson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 713 F.2d 705, 712–13 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
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awarded attorneys’ fees approximately 40% of the time in 
summary judgment decisions against patent holders, no courts 
during this time have awarded attorneys’ fees following a 
summary judgment decision denying an alleged infringer’s claim 
of inequitable conduct.206  In this way, then, while courts arguably 
have the power to curtail frivolous inequitable conduct claims by 
imposing attorneys’ fees, they have so far refrained from doing 
so,207 likely because they do not view spurious allegations of 
inequitable conduct as “exceptional” cases permitting the award of 
attorneys’ fees. 
The answer therefore appears to lie in amending Section 285 to 
provide that a party claiming inequitable conduct must pay for 
opposing counsel’s attorneys’ fees in the event such party’s claim 
is dismissed upon a summary judgment motion.  Such legislative 
reform would remove an alleged patent infringer’s incentive to file 
a meritless claim of inequitable conduct.  In so doing, the reform 
would reduce litigation costs and increase patent quality without 
usurping the judiciary’s role and changing the inequitable conduct 
doctrine when, in fact, no such change is needed. 
 
 206 Nolan-Stevaux, supra note 125, at 168. 
 207 See Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 831 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (finding litigation 
may merit award of attorney fees); Bayer Aktiengesellschaft v. Duphar Int’l Research 
B.V., 738 F.2d 1237, 1242–43 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (awarding fees for a frivolous position 
advanced by a party). 
